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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-20127
MICHAEL A. CANNON,
Plaintiff - Appellant
United States Court of Appeals 
Fifth Circuit
FILED
January 13, 2016
Lyle W. Cayce 
Clerk
v.
JACOBS FIELD SERVICES NORTH AMERICA, INCORPORATED,
Defendant - Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Texas
Before JOLLY, HAYNES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.
GREGG COSTA, Circuit Judge:
Jacobs Field Services (JFS), a construction company, offered Michael 
Cannon a job as a field engineer at a Colorado mining site. But it quickly 
revoked the offer after learning that Cannon had a rotator cuff impairment 
that prevented him from lifting his right arm above the shoulder. Cannon 
brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district 
court granted summary judgment, finding that Cannon could not prove that 
he was disabled or a qualified individual. Because the first finding ignored 
Congress’s expansion of the definition of disability when it amended the ADA 
in 2008 and a factual dispute exists on the second, we reverse.
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I.
Cannon is a mechanical engineer with over twenty years of experience.1 
In 2010, he had surgery to repair a torn rotator cuff in his right shoulder. The 
surgery was unsuccessful. As a result, Cannon can no longer raise his right 
arm above shoulder level, and is limited in his ability to push or pull with his 
right arm.
In 2011, Cannon applied for a job as a field engineer with JFS. JFS 
offered him the job. Cannon underwent a pre-employment physical. During 
the exam, Cannon told the doctor about his inoperable rotator cuff injury and 
that he had previously taken the prescription pain reliever Ultram, which is 
the brand name version of the opioid Tramadol. Cannon explained that 
although he still had a prescription for Tramadol, he was no longer taking it. 
Cannon passed the drug test administered as part of the physical. The doctor 
cleared Cannon for the position so long as JFS offered the following 
accommodations for the rotator cuff injury: no driving company vehicles; no 
lifting, pushing, or pulling more than ten pounds; and no working with his 
hands above shoulder level.
JFS did not agree to the proposed accommodations. Instead, on July 18, 
the same day it received the “Medical Clearance” form with the list of 
accommodations, it determined that Cannon was physically incapable of 
performing the job. Although there is conflicting evidence about who made the 
decision to rescind the offer, the turning point occurred when human resources 
notified the technical services manager at the Colorado job site about the 
doctor’s proposed accommodations and sought approval to proceed with 
Cannon’s hiring. In response, the technical services manager stated that
1 Given the summary judgment posture, this section construes the evidence in the 
light most favorable to Cannon.
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Cannon would “not be able to meet the project needs and required job duties” 
and explained that the job required an employee “capable of driving, climbing, 
lifting, and walking” as the job site was located “in the mountains with 
rough/rocky terrain” and “spread over several miles.”
A human resources representative contacted Cannon around this time. 
Not mentioning the seemingly unequivocal position taken by the manager that 
Cannon could not do the job, the HR representative informed Cannon only that 
JFS had concerns that he could not reach above his head with his right arm. 
Cannon asked whether he could contact someone to resolve the concerns and 
was told to call the Occupational Health Department. Cannon promptly did so 
and was told that JFS needed him to clarify whether (1) he could climb a ladder 
and (2) was still taking Ultram. Again, there was no indication that the job 
offer had been rescinded, and Cannon took the requests for additional 
information to mean that satisfactory responses would eliminate the concerns. 
Cannon provided the requested information, submitting documentation from 
his doctor stating that he was “specifically cleared for climbing vertical ladders 
and maintaining 3-point contact with either arm”2 and was being weaned from 
Ultram.
No one from JFS followed up with Cannon to discuss the doctor’s notes 
he had submitted. Instead, during a call on July 20, the same day Cannon 
submitted the clearance forms from his doctor, JFS informed Cannon that it 
was rescinding the offer based on his inability to climb a ladder. Cannon 
continued to try to prove to JFS that he was capable of climbing a ladder in an 
effort to have his offer reinstated—sending a video of himself climbing a ladder 
while maintaining 3-point contact. JFS did not respond. Cannon made
2 Climbing a ladder using 3-point contact is an “OSHA-driven requirement” which is 
designed to prevent injury from “slipping, falling down, hitting the ground” because if a 
climber’s feet slip, he can still catch himself with his hands, which should be on the ladder.
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additional attempts to try to contact JFS and discuss his injury and 
limitations. These efforts were unsuccessful.
Cannon filed a complaint with the EEOC. The EEOC concluded that 
JFS engaged in disability discrimination because: (1) JFS failed to engage in 
the interactive process with Cannon; (2) providing Cannon with the requested 
accommodations would not have imposed an undue hardship on JFS; and (3) 
JFS did not demonstrate that Cannon would have posed a “direct threat to 
himself or to his coworkers” as a field engineer. JFS refused to engage in the 
EEOC-directed conciliation process, so the EEOC issued a Notice of Right to 
Sue. Cannon filed this lawsuit.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of JFS. It found 
that Cannon’s rotator cuff injury did not render him disabled under the ADA, 
and, even if he were disabled, he was not qualified for the field engineer 
position. The district court did not specifically address a failure-to- 
accommodate claim that the parties had briefed.
II.
This Court reviews de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, 
viewing “all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party.” EEOC v. LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 694 (5th Cir. 2014). Summary 
judgment is only appropriate if the movant has shown that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact such that the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
III.
The ADA prohibits discrimination against on the basis of a disability. 
Griffin v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 661 F.3d 216, 221-22 (5th Cir. 2011). As 
with other antidiscrimination statutes in the employment context, a plaintiff 
trying to show a violation of the ADA using circumstantial evidence must 
satisfy the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. E.E.O.C. v.
4
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Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., LP, 570 F.3d 606, 615 (5th Cir. 2009). To make 
out his prima facie showing under that framework, Cannon must show that: 
(1) the plaintiff has a disability, or was regarded as disabled; (2) he was 
qualified for the job; and (3) he was subject to an adverse employment decision 
on account of his disability. EEOC v. LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 697 (5th 
Cir. 2014). If he makes that showing, a presumption of discrimination arises, 
and the employer must “articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for 
the adverse employment action.” Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., LP, 570 F.3d at 
615. The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to produce evidence from which a 
jury could conclude that the employer’s articulated reason is pretextual. See 
id.
A.
Under the ADA, an individual suffers from a “disability,” if that 
individual has “a physical . . . impairment that substantially limits one or 
more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). The district court concluded 
that Cannon was not disabled because his “injured shoulder did not 
substantially impair[] his daily functioning.” Whatever merit that finding of 
no disability may have had under the original ADA, it is at odds with changes 
brought about by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008. Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 
Stat. 3553 (2008). Those amendments “make it easier for people with 
disabilities to obtain protection under the ADA.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4). A 
principal way in which Congress accomplished that goal was to broaden the 
definition of “disability.” Id. Two features of that expanded concept of 
disability support a finding of disability in this case.
The first aspect of the 2008 Act that helps establish Cannon’s injury as 
a disability is its clarification that the Supreme Court and EEOC had 
interpreted the “substantially limits” standard to be a more demanding one 
than Congress had intended. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 note (ADA Amendments Act
5
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of 2008) (expressly disapproving of prior Supreme Court decisions and EEOC 
interpretations of the “substantially limits” standard); Neely v. PSEG Tex., Ltd 
P ’ship, 735 F.3d 242, 245 (5th Cir. 2013) (stating that the ADAAA was passed 
to correct the perceived misconception that the “substantially limits” standard 
is a demanding inquiry). The 2008 Act thus provides “Rules of Construction 
Regarding the Definition of Disability,” which focus on construing the 
“substantially limits” standard “in favor of broad coverage.” 42 U.S.C. § 
12102(4). EEOC regulations implementing the 2008 Amendments follow this 
command in concluding that “the threshold issue of whether an impairment 
‘substantially limits’ a major life activity should not demand extensive 
analysis,” and the term “shall be interpreted and applied to require a degree of 
functional limitation that is lower than the standard for ‘substantially limits’ 
applied” previously. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii)-(iv). The inquiry in this post­
amendment case is thus whether Cannon’s impairment substantially limits his 
ability “to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the 
general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).
There is ample evidence to support a conclusion that Cannon’s injury 
qualifies as a disability under the more relaxed standard. Although the district 
court concluded otherwise, the ADA includes “lifting” in its list of major life 
activities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (stating that “major life activities 
include, but are not limited to . . . lifting, bending, speaking, [etc.]”); see also 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (also including “reaching” as a major life activity). Given 
that lifting and reaching are “major life activities,” Cannon’s shoulder injury 
is a qualifying disability if it “substantially limits” his ability to perform such 
tasks. There is certainly evidence to that effect. Cannon and his doctor both 
stated that he is unable to lift his right arm above shoulder level and that he 
has considerable difficulty lifting, pushing, or pulling objects with his right 
arm. This does not even appear to be disputed; the limitations posed by
6
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Cannon’s shoulder injury are what led JFS to rescind the offer.3 Less than two 
hours after receiving the report of Cannon’s physical, the technical operations 
officer at the mining project wrote that the job offer should be rescinded 
because a field engineer must be “capable of driving, climbing, lifting and 
walking” and “[b]ased on the list of required accommodations Mr. Cannon will 
not be able to meet the project needs and required job duties.”
JFS’s belief that Cannon’s injury resulted in substantial impairment— 
even if that view were mistaken—is the second reason why the 2008 
amendments support a finding that Cannon was disabled. The ADA now 
covers not just someone who is disabled but also those subjected to 
discrimination because they are “regarded as having . . . an actual or perceived 
physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is 
perceived to limit a major life activity.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(C), 3(A) 
(emphasis added). The amended “regarded as” provision reflects the view that 
“unfounded concerns, mistaken beliefs, fears, myths, or prejudice about 
disabilities are just as disabling as actual impairments.” 29 C.F.R. § Pt. 1630, 
App. § 1630.2(1) (quoting 2008 Senate Statement of Managers at 9; 2008 House 
Judiciary Committee Report at 17). It overrules “prior authority ‘requiring a 
plaintiff to show that the employer regarded him or her as being substantially 
limited in a major life activity.’” Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798
3 The district court relied in large part on Cannon’s own statements in finding that 
there was no evidence that his shoulder substantially impaired his daily functioning. 
Specifically, the court pointed to Cannon’s statements that he was able to climb a ladder and 
“need[ed] no accommodation” to perform the tasks required of a field engineer. But these 
statements do not undermine the evidence indicating that his injury substantially limits his 
ability to lift, which is all that is required to establish a disability. Indeed, Cannon explained 
that he did not need an accommodation only because he compensates for his right arm’s 
limitations through greater use of his left arm—“my reasonable accommodation is what God 
already gave me. . . . I have a working left shoulder to take over what my right shoulder can’t 
do.” The medical clearance form from his doctor also emphasized that Cannon will have to 
compensate for his inability to use his right arm by relying more heavily on his left arm.
7
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F.3d 222, 230 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Dube v. Texas Health & Human Servs. 
Comm’n, Case No. SA-11-CV-354-XR, 2012 WL 2397566, at *3 (W.D.Tex. 
June 25, 2012)). The evidence favoring Cannon again easily passes muster 
under the revised standard requiring only the perception that he suffered from 
a physical impairment.4 The email from the technical services manager cited 
above, as well as other evidence such as the report from Cannon’s physical, 
support a finding that officials at JFS perceived his shoulder injury to be an 
impairment. See id . at 231 (holding that employer regarded the plaintiff as 
disabled when the supporting documentation for plaintiff’s termination 
specifically tied “complaints about [plaintiffs] conduct to her asserted medical 
needs”).
We thus conclude that evidence exists supporting a finding either that 
Cannon is disabled or was regarded as disabled.
B.
That brings us the closer question of whether, despite Cannon’s 
impairments, he was still qualified for the field engineer position. To be a 
qualified employee, Cannon must be able to show that he could either (1) 
“perform the essential functions of the job in spite of [his] disability,” or (2) that 
“a reasonable accommodation of [his] disability would have enabled [him] to 
perform the essential functions of his job.” EEOC v. LHC Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d 
688, 697 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotations omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12111(8). A function is “essential” if it bears “more than a marginal 
relationship” to the employee’s job. Chandler v. City of Dall., 2 F.3d 1385, 1393 
(5th Cir. 1993), holding modified on other grounds as discussed in Kapche v.
4 The district court applied the prior standard in rejecting the possibility that Cannon 
was “regarded as disabled” because “[c]limbing a ladder is not a major-life activity.” The 
district court also focused only on Jacobs’s concerns with whether Cannon could climb a 
ladder; but the email expresses doubt about whether Cannon can perform multiple activities.
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City of San Antonio, 304 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2002). JFS contends that driving 
a company vehicle and climbing a ladder are essential functions of the field 
engineer position and argues that Cannon cannot do either because of his 
prescription for painkillers and his rotator cuff injury.
We first address driving, which the district court held was essential 
because of the vastness of the worksite and a function that Cannon could not 
perform because of his Ultram prescription. Assuming that driving is an 
essential function of the field engineer position, a conclusion that Cannon 
disputes, there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that 
Cannon was able to perform that duty. JFS cites an unwritten, though quite 
sensible, policy that “employees who are taking narcotics are not permitted to 
operate company vehicles.” But there is a dispute about whether Cannon was 
still taking the medication or, at the least, could have stopped taking it once 
he started working. The painkiller was prescribed “as needed.” Cannon 
asserts he stopped taking the medication prior to applying and informed JFS 
of that prior to being told that his offer had been revoked. On his pre­
employment drug test, Cannon did not test positive for any of the substances 
JFS tries to detect.5 And Cannon’s doctor informed JFS that Cannon was 
“being weaned” off Ultram. Although in some tension with Cannon’s statement 
that he had already stopped using, the doctor’s statement provides further 
support for the conclusion that Cannon could have performed the job without 
using the painkiller. To be sure, JFS can point to evidence that counters this
5 The district court assumed that the drug test would have detected Ultram, 
explaining the negative test away on the ground that it “merely shows that he had not taken 
it at the time.” JFS argues that this is not the case, and that the drug test only looks for 
illegal narcotics banned under its separate, written policy prohibiting use of those 
substances. Of course, if that is the case, failure to test for prescription painkillers may cast 
doubt on whether JFS maintains a separate unwritten policy. In any event, even discounting 
the drug test, the other evidence cited above is sufficient to create a fact issue about whether 
Cannon could have performed the job without using Ultram.
9
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view, most notably Cannon’s extensive history of Ultram use which continued 
after JFS rescinded the job offer. In the end, however, the evidence creates a 
dispute that a jury should decide about whether Cannon could have avoided 
taking the medication while working for JFS.
The same is true for the federal mining regulation that JFS relied on in 
its summary judgment motion, though the regulation was not 
contemporaneously cited as a reason for rescinding Cannon’s offer. See 30
C.F.R. § 57.20001 (“Intoxicating beverages and narcotics shall not be permitted 
or used in or around mines. Persons under the influence of alcohol or narcotics 
shall not be permitted on the job.”). Putting aside unresolved questions about 
the scope of the rule (what proximity to a mine satisfies the “around mines” 
standard given that Cannon was not going to be working in the mine), it only 
applies to those “under the influence” of narcotics and not just those with a 
prescription who may no longer be using. It is also not clear from the record 
how long Ultram would remain in Cannon’s system even if he used it after 
working hours. For comparison’s sake, just as the regulation sensibly bars 
persons “under the influence of alcohol” from a mine, it does not bar those who 
have ever consumed alcohol or who do so at home the night before a shift.
The next essential function that JFS found disqualifying is climbing a 
ladder. This time Cannon agrees that the field engineer job requires the 
ability to climb a ladder. The job site includes steep pipeline trenches and 
“pipe racks” that require ladders. But there is conflicting evidence about 
whether Cannon can climb the ladder with reasonable accommodation. 
Cannon’s doctor submitted a medical release to JFS stating that Cannon 
“specifically is cleared for climbing vertical ladders and maintaining 3-point 
contact with either arm” despite the shoulder injury. And after learning that 
JFS rescinded his job offer based on its belief that the shoulder injury would 
prevent him from climbing a ladder, Cannon submitted a video of himself
10
Case: 15-20127 Document: 00513340789 Page: 11 Date Filed: 01/13/2016
No. 15-20127
climbing a ladder while maintaining 3-point contact. Cannon conceded at his 
deposition, however, that in the video he raised his injured arm above his 
shoulder in violation of his doctor’s orders. See Alexander v. Northland Inn, 
321 F.3d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The ADA does not require an employer to 
permit an employee to perform a job function that the employee’s physician 
has forbidden.”).
In light of the doctor’s note and video, we are unable to conclude that 
there is no evidence supporting the view that Cannon can limb a ladder despite 
his impairment. The parties may have been able to get to the bottom of the 
“ladder climbing” question if JFS had conducted a more thorough inquiry after 
learning about Cannon’s injury. For example, it could have questioned Cannon 
or his doctor at the time or asked Cannon to demonstrate an ability to climb a 
ladder. Given the speed at which JFS rescinded Cannon’s offer, the record is 
thin. Because there is some evidence that supports a finding that Cannon 
could perform this function, summary judgment is not appropriate on this 
basis.
C.
That leaves pretext as the remaining basis on which the district court 
ruled in JFS’s favor. Summary judgment rulings in employment 
discrimination cases based on circumstantial evidence often boil down to 
difficult assessments of pretext. Not so in this ADA case. The district court’s 
finding of no pretext flowed logically from its conclusions that Cannon was not 
disabled and not qualified: “There can be no pretext when the facts show that 
Cannon was disqualified for the job and not disabled.” Our contrary view that 
the evidence does not compel those findings also easily resolves the remaining 
McDonnell-Douglas inquiries.
Perhaps the better way to frame the question is whether JFC has 
asserted a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for rescinding Cannon’s offer,
11
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a burden that is usually easily satisfied. But JFS has never cited a reason for 
rescinding Cannon’s offer, such as deciding to reduce the workforce at the site 
or having found a more experienced applicant, which is divorced from his 
physical impairment. It has always maintained—and the timing of events 
strongly supports— that it decided not to hire Cannon once it learned of his 
shoulder injury and the ways in which it may limit his ability to perform the 
job. The legitimacy of that justification turns on whether Cannon was disabled 
and qualified for the job. If JFS convinces a jury that Cannon cannot perform 
essential functions of the job because of the injury, then it has offered a lawful 
reason for its decision. But if the jury credits the evidence we have cited 
favoring Cannon and concludes he was disabled, yet still qualified to be a field 
engineer, then revoking Cannon’s job offer based on his physical impairment 
would have constituted the discrimination that the ADA forbids. We thus need 
not to address Cannon’s arguments about alleged inconsistencies in who made 
the decision to rescind his offer, the contemporaneous justification for doing so, 
and whether the decision was withheld from Cannon while other JFS 
employees were asking him for more information. All of this can, of course, be 
considered at trial.
IV.
This leaves one wrinkle. In dismissing the disability discrimination 
claim, the district court did not separately address a failure-to-accommodate 
claim that the summary judgment briefing addressed. This omission may have 
been because the findings of “no disability” and “no qualified individual” would 
also doom a failure-to-accommodate claim. See Neely, 735 F.3d at 247 
(explaining that a plaintiff must be a “qualified individual” to sustain a failure- 
to-accommodate claim). Or perhaps it was because JFS had previously filed a 
motion to dismiss arguing that Cannon’s complaint did not allege failure to 
accommodate. But the district court never decided that motion to dismiss (to
12
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which the response had sought leave to amend in the event the motion was 
granted), and the case proceeded to the summary judgment stage at which both 
sides argued the merits of such a claim in both the trial court and on appeal.
Given that the district court never dismissed the claim for pleading 
deficiencies, we can assess only whether summary judgment was warranted 
on a claim of failure to accommodate. We have already found that Cannon may 
be able to convince a jury that he is both disabled and qualified for the position. 
Although a plaintiff must usually request an accommodation to commence an 
interactive process that considers that possibility, he is excused from doing so 
in a situation like this one in which the employer was unquestionably aware 
of the disability and had received a report from its own doctor recommending 
accommodations. Taylor v. Principal Fin. Grp., LLC, 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 
2009) (stating that a plaintiff bears the responsibility of requesting an 
accommodation only when “the disability, resulting limitations, and necessary 
reasonable accommodations are not open, obvious, and apparent to the 
employer”). And looking at the facts in Cannon’s favor, there is little argument 
to be made that JFS engaged in the interactive process the law requires. It 
rescinded the offer almost immediately after learning of Cannon’s impairment 
without further exploration of his impairment or even waiting for his responses 
to the questions posed by the Occupational Health Department.
k  k  k
We REVERSE the grant of summary judgment and REMAND this case.
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